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Reviewed by David S. Bogen 
Editor's Note: After receiving his LL.B. from 
Harvard, Professor Bogen clerked for Justice 
Jacob Spiegel of the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court. He then received an Arthur 
Garfield Hays Civil Liberties Fellowship to 
New York University Law School, where he 
earned his LL.M. He spent two more years in 
New York as an associate in a large firm be-fore he came to the University of Maryland 
School of Law where he is now an Associate 
Professor. 
The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History 
In 1935, an unusual thing happened- the 
U.S. received a bequest: 
... All of the rest, residue and remainder 
of my pr>operty of whatsoever nature, 
wheresoever situate, of which I may die 
seized and possessed, or in which I may 
have an interest at the time of my death, 
I give, devise, and bequeath to the United 
States .•. 
The remainder of the estate of the ninety-
three year old Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 
Associate Justice of the United States Supreme 
Court, amounted to more than $263,000. About 
a month after the recording of the will, Presi-
dent Franklin D. Roosevelt, somewhat befud· 
dled with what to do with the money, sent a 
message to Congress praising Justice Holmes 
and suggesting that the gift be used in a man-
ner worthy of its donor. The President rec-
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ommended that the bequest be set aside in a 
special fund and, "at a later date be devoted 
to purposes which will effectively promote the 
contribution which law can make to the na-
tional welfare." 
Three years later Congress ad;opted a public 
resolution creating a nine-member committee, 
composed of three members of the House, 
Senate and Supreme Court each, to investigate 
the possible uses of the bequest. The commit-
tee's ultimate recommendations were never 
consummated, as World War II foreed a de-ferral of its plans. Subsequent to the war, how-
ever, the committee, then chaired by Chief 
Justice Earl Warren, proposed Jthe adoption of 
a bill to create the Oliver Wendell Holmes 
Devise Fund. A 1955 Congressional Act passed 
in accordance with the committee's recom-
mendations established a Permanent Commit-
tee to administer the fund, the purpose of 
which was :to prepare and publish a history of 
the Supreme Court of the United States. 
President Eisenhower designated the first four appointees to the Permanent Committee 
in 1956 (the Librarian of Congress serves as 
the ex officio chairman) and later that same 
year Paul A. Freund of Harvard Law School 
was appointed Editor-in-Chief of the multi-
volume work. After a careful study of contem-
porary legal scholars, invitations were ex-
tended to various authors, all experts in the 
sundry historical periods for which they con-
tracted to write. The authors began their in-
credible. tasks shortly after the Committee had finished negotiations with the Macmillan Com-
pany in 1958 to publish the definitive history. 
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The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History, 
to be published in eleven volumes with a one 
volume supplement of charts, photographs and 
biographical sketches, is intended to fill an 
incredible void in legal literature by setting 
the vital work of the court against a compre-
hensive, interpretative backdrop of political, 
social and economic history. It is also meant 
to be an expert examination of the profes-
sional task of the court and an analysis of the 
institution as it settles specific controversies 
through the process of collective decision-
making. 
Charles Fairman, Professor of Law Emer-
itus at Harvard Law School and author of 
Volume VI, Reconstruction and Reunion, 1864-
88, Part One, received his A.B. and A.M. from the University of Illinois (1918 and 1920, 
respectively), his Ph.D. in g.overnment and 
S.J.D. from Harvard (1926 and 1938, respec-
tively) and his LL.B. from the University of 
London (1934). Aside from numerous fellow-
ships and other activities during his dis-
tinguished career, Professor Fairman has 
written thre.e books and numerous law review 
articles on the various aspects of the Supreme 
Court and its history. Presently, he is in the 
process of writing the second par.t of Recon-
struction and Reunion, which will be published 
as Volume VII. 
We have waited a. long time for the first volumes of the History of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, but the delay has 
been amply justified in the case of Professor 
Charles Fairman's Reconstruction and Reunion, 
1864-88, Part One by its superb quality.1 This 
first portion of his work covers ess.entially the 
period from 1864-1873 when Salmon P. Chase 
was Chief Justice. The primary focus of the 
book is on the Court in its relationship to the 
problems of reconstruction: the enactment of 
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
the post-war status of the secessionist states 
and the legality of measures connected with the 
war. 
Professor Fairman has created a rich tap-
estry of the Supreme Court in the Context of 
Reconstruction. The fabric is the letters, 
speeches, and other writings of the period. He 
weaves together physical descriptions of the 
Court and excerpts from Congressional debate, 
household details of the justices' lives and the 
tactics of those opposed to Reconstruction. The 
particular attention to small details, combined 
with an appreciation for the larger events 
which transpired, provides a remarkable por-
trait of the Court at a critical historical period. 
The book is unquestionably the finest exist-
ing account of the Court in the Reconstruction 
period. But who cares what happened a cen-
tury ago? Two items from the work suggest 
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this questioning of the relevance of history. 
The tracking of the enactment of the Four-
teenth Amendment demonstrates that history 
may hold no answers for us today, and Fair-
man's discussion of Jones v. Mayer2 suggests 
that, whatever answers history can provide, 
they may be ignored if they are not convenient. 
Fairman's attack on Justice Black's theory 
that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates 
the Bill of Rights is well-known. A glance at 
Maryland Senator Reverdy Johnson's speech 
moving to strike the privileges and immunities 
clause may suffice to illustrate Fairman's con-
tention: "I think it quite objectionable to pro-
vide [the privileges and immunities provision], 
simply because I do not understand what will 
be the effect of that."3 Fairman notes that 
Johnson "had participated in the Joint Com-
mittee [which drafted the Amendment] ... had 
heard Howard's presentation [relied on by Jus-
tice Black to show that the Bill of Rights was 
intended to be incorporated by the Fourteenth] 
... and still did not understand what the effect 
of the clause would be. Coming from him, that 
amounted to a certificate that, for purposes of 
litigation, the privileges and immunities clause 
did not have a definite meaning."4 This his-
torical analysis does not foreclose Justice 
Black's interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but simply reveals it to be one of 
many permissible choices for breathing essence 
into a vague and historically undefined concept. 
Professor Fairman has 
created a 
rich tapestry of the 
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Such history, in a sense, frees us from history, 
permitting our changing society to impart 
new civilization into its basic governmental 
structure. 
Sometimes, however, history does have an 
answer. What, though, is the value of an an-
swer to a historical question? If it is incon-
venient, it may be ignored. Thus, the Supreme 
Court held in Jones v. Mayer that the Civil 
Rjghts Act of 1866 applied to private dis-
crimination in the sale of housing. Fairman 
demonstrates that the language from Con-
gressional debates, quoted by the Jones major-
ity, does not support their statutory conclu-
sions and that there were clear expressions by 
leading Congressmen that the Act applied 
solely to discrimination by the states. For ex-
ample, Representative Shellabarger of Ohio 
said: "The bill does not reach mere private 
wrongs, but only those done under color of 
State authority ... its whole force is expended 
in defeating an attempt, under State laws, to 
deprive races and members thereof as such of 
the rights enumerated in this act. This is the 
whole of it.''5 
The history belieing Jones, much of which 
appears in Justice Harlan's dissent, seems ir-
refutable. The Court, however, avoids it in part 
byfocusing on the enormity of the injustice of 
private discrimination. The highest court "al-
But the McCardle 
experience suggests that 
significant 
Congressional power 
over the Court may not 
be so bad. 
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lowed itself to believe impossible things - as 
though the dawning enlightenment of 1968 
could be ascribed to the Congress of a century 
agone.''6 The depth of Fairman's feeling of 
betrayal by the Court appears in part in a foot-
note wherein he suggests that the Court's per-
formance in Jones is comparable to Lewis 
Carroll's Through the Looking Glass: "Alice 
laughed. 'There's no use trying,' she said: 'one 
can't believe impossible things.' 'I daresay you 
haven't had much practice,' said the Queen."7 
Why not believe "impossible things"? The 
housing law of the 1866 Act, as the Supreme 
Court and several lower courts have interpreted 
it, is a good and valuable law even if it is not 
what the Congressmen thought they were en-
acting. The parallel with Fairman's own views 
on the enactment of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and the case of Ex parte McCardle8 is 
striking. In McCardle, the Court acknowledged 
Congressional power to remove from its juris-
diction a case posing issues of the constitu-
tionality of Reconstruction. Shielded from a 
potentially adverse judicial ruling on Recon-
struction, Congress was able to force the 
secessionist states to ratify the Fourteenth 
Amendment as a condition for readmission to 
political power and relief from military rule. 
A larger measure of racial equality was 
achieved by means which are generally disap-
proved. "Military administration of the South-
ern States has seemed unconstitutional on its 
face. Men have found it easy to condemn Con-
gressional defiance of the Court as a partisan 
excess - and then have gone on to praise the 
new freedom secured by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, with never a thought for its in-
consistency. But to be honest with the facts, 
one may not extol the benefit yet repugn the 
cost."9 
In the discussion of McCardle, another aspect 
of history is revealed - history as a basis for judging institutions. It would be foolish to 
accept the premise that Congressional power 
over the Court brought greater freedom to the 
nation as proof of the conclusion that such 
power should exist. That same power may 
render the Fourteenth Amendment's promise 
illusory, as evidenced by recent prohibitions on 
lower court busing orders. But the McCardle 
experience. suggests that significant Congres-
sional power over the Court may not be so bad. 
The elimination of Supreme Court jurisdiction 
can be accomplished with less votes than those 
necessary to initiate a constitutional amend-
ment, but it is so fraught with problems of 
internal morality and anomalous law that it 
may well have fewer supporters than a consti-
tutional amendment. Thus, its use may prevent 
unwise constitutional tampering as a tempo-
rary expedient for temporary problems. But 
in the long run, total refusal to let the Court 
play a role in interpreting our national moral 
principles will lead to further loss of confi-
dence in the judiciary and in our moral selves.10 
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This notion brings us back to Jones v. Mayer 
for, if the Court is to be looked upon as the 
guardian of our national moral principles, as 
expressed in the Constitution, it is essential 
that i.ts integrity be established. As Fairman 
says with reference to the McCardle case, 
"[s] ubmission to the Court as the true voice 
of the Constitution presuppose1s an established 
confidence in the lofty disinterestedness of its 
members-something that at the time of M c-
Cardle the Court did not enjoy and did not 
deserve."11 Thus a failure to be honest with 
history and to respect even the unhappy facts 
threaten the integrity of the Court and, in turn, 
undercut its ability to uphold the ideals of the 
equal protection clause and .. to apply them to 
the segregated school systems of America. 
History can free us from the tyranny of an 
imagined past, or it can bind us to it. Never-
theles·s, history is cfar more frequently use-
ful 'as one of the many aids to today's de-
cision-making. By understanding how we ar-
rived at our present situation, we may better 
choose among the alternatives available to us. 
Providing such an understanding is Professor 
Fairman's forte. Many pages are lovingly de-
voted, with painstaking description and analy-
sis, to.the municipal bond cases. Here, Fairman 
does the most extensive new original research; 
pointing out how neglected these decisions 
were. But the neglect has hardly been unin-
1972 
/ 
f ~.~.·", ~jJ 
tentional. Since the principal Supreme Court 
cases on municipal bonds in this era arose out 
of diversity jurisdiction and applied a concept 
of federal law, they are valueless as prece-
dents today. This mode of proceeding was 
repudiated in Erie v. Tompkins12 and the deci-
sions before it would seem to be merely his-
torical curiosities. So why the curiosity for 
Fairman? The bond cases loomed large and 
were, in fact, the largest single type of case 
on the docket of the Court. A true feel for. the 
functioning of the Court could. hardly be at-
tained by ignoring such matters. Butthat alone 
is insufficient to account for their extensive 
treatment by Fairman. The cases, relics to be 
sure, suggest the. impetus behind Erie v. 
Tompkins and serve as cautio.ns aga;inst a 
reversion by :15ederal and state courts to sepa-
rate rules of decision in diversity cases. The 
unnecessary tangles of federal and state law 
that made Iowa· and Missouri sharply resist 
federal dominance breathe a warndng of the 
wisdom of Brandeis. But even further, these 
cases show the Supreme Court operating in 
a speci'al and, it can be hoped, aberrational 
way. Here "all other policies or values or 
interests were submerged in a high tide of 
feeling on the Court about a particular social 
cause."13 Thus Justice Miller wrote to his 
brother-in-law: "Our court or a majority of it 
are, if not monomaniacs, as much bigots and 
fanatics on that subject [contracts against a 
23 
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municipal corporation] as is the most unhesi-
tating Mahemodan in regard to his religion. 
In four cases out of five the case is decided 
when it is seen by the pleadings that it is a 
suit to enforce a contract against a city, or 
town, or a county. If there is a written instru-
ment, its· validity is a foregone conclusion."14 
Thus, a curious relic leads to greater appre-
ciation of our federal diversity jurisdiction and 
to an awareness of how emotions may sway a 
court. Indeed, much of this history establishes, 
by inference, a classical model of judicial con-
duct and demonstrates the problems created 
by departure from the model. 
Adherence to the classical judicial model 
does 'not, in and of itself, bring respect 
to the Court. Such respect also depends upon 
the perception of the justices, the condition 
of society a.nd a degree of good luck. 
For example, the classical model dictates 
that the judge refrain from deciding issues not 
before him. Fairman makes this point in his 
examination of the Court's opinion in Ex parte 
Milligan.15 The issue here was the legality of 
imprisonment of the civilian Milligan pursuant 
to a military trial in a state which did not 
secede from the Union. The concurring opinion 
of Chase stated, in effect, that existing legis-
lation required trial by civilian courts. Justice 
Davis, for the Court, went beyond Chase to 
hold that the trial by the military commission 
was unconstitutional. In fact, Davis went even 
further, stating that, although admittedly Con-
gress had not authorized Milligan's trial, if it 
had attempted to so authorize, "Congress could 
grant no such power."16 This unabashed dictum 
served notice that a majority of the Court 
would consider Congress powerless to establish 
military commissions for the trial of invasions 
of civil rights. When the issue of Congressional 
power to establish military rule in the rebel 
states arose after the war, Congress was un-
willing to let the court decide it. Fairman con-
cludes that "the needless breadth of the lan-
guage in Milligan should be reckoned as the 
starting point in the sequence of actions and 
reactions that led to the statute of March 27, 
1868, whereby Congress took away the Court's 
jurisdiction in Ex parte McCardle, deliberately 
to forestall a decision on the constitutionality 
of the Reconstruction Acts."11 
We cannot know what would have happened 
if the Court in Milligan had confined itself to 
the precise issue before it. If Fairman is cor-
rect, itis possible that Davis' dictum may have 
saved the Court from a politically damaging 
decision which would have destroyed Recon-
24 
struction. It is certain, however, that Davis' 
unnecessary discussion of legislative power 
weakened the respect for the Court and exposed 
it to severe attacks at a time when its reputa-
tion was already low. 
Although the justices often attain their posi-
tions by virtue of political involvement, they 
should avoid it once they are in office. The 
dignity of the Court dropped still further dur-
ing Chase's term as Chief Justice as a result 
of the political machinations of several of the 
justices, especially Chase himself. Fairman 
chronicles in loving detail Chase's fruitless 
quest for the Presidency. His political desires 
apparently led him to compromise his convic-
tions. In pursuit of the Democratic presidential 
nomination, he abandoned his previously stated 
opinion that the Thirteenth Amendment gave 
Congress power to promulgate universal suf-
frage. Upon Chase's death, the judgments of 
his peers often focused on his failure as a jus-
tice because of his presidential ambitions. For 
instance, Harpers Weekly, while eulogizing 
Chase on one page, stated on another, with 
respect to his successor, that it hoped he 
would be one who "[would] find all his powers 
engaged and his ambition fully satisfied with 
the proper duties of his office."18 
The model for a judge goes beyond concern 
for individual behavior; avoiding dicta, poli-
tics and partiality, he should also demonstrate 
concern for the institution of the Court in the 
processes of collective· decision-making. Here 
again, the Court fared badly during this 
period, failing to be sufficiently sensitive to 
the problems posed by Justice Grier's poor 
health. Grier's mental and physical decline is 
portrayed in excerpts from his letters and 
comments of his contemporaries, culminating 
in this description of Grier during his last days 
on the bench: "[Justices Sayne, Nelson and 
Davis] are greatly exercised at his [Grier's] 
not resigning - They declared they were go-
ing to crowd him about December 1, '69. He 
sleeps on the bench, drops his head down and 
looks very badly. Congress will also crowd him 
if he don't resign."I9 
Despite the apparent decline in Grier's 
mental ability and his imminent retirement, 
the Court pressed on to a decision in Hepburn 
v. Griswold20 (which depended on his vote) 
that the Legal Tender Act was unconstitu-
tional as applied to debts contracted before its 
enactment. The decision was announced on the 
same day that President Grant nominated two 
new pro-Legal Tender justices, Strong and 
Bradley, to the Court. Further, Grier's vote 
with the majority was subject to great ques-
tion. He apparently changed his vote in confer-
ence because of inconsistencies between his 
then current opinion and remarks he had made 
earlier in a related case. Fairman suggests 
that Grier initially thought that the Legal 
'fender Act should not be construed to apply 
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to pre-existing debts, but that Congress could 
have constitutionally made it do so, and that in 
his vote he simply lost his wayP It is intri-
guing to speculate why the Court proceeded to 
a decision. Chase may have felt the peculiar 
zeal of the reformed sinner in getting the Legal 
Tender Act declared unconstitutional, for it 
was he, as Secretary of the Treasury, who first 
sanctioned the measure. Perhaps he also hoped 
to utilize Hepburn and the doctrine of stare 
decisis to silence the convictions of his new col-
leagues. Fairman suggests that the Court 
should have awaited the arrival of the new justices and called for reargument, primarily 
because he feels that it was inappropriate to 
render an opinion on such a momentous matter, 
based on the vote of a "confused mind."22 The 
Court's reversal of its decision on Legal Tender 
in the same term made the first decision appear 
a grave mistake, and dealt another crippling 
blow to the Court's prestige as a disinterested 
and impartial judicial body.23 
Adherence to the classical judicial model 
does not, in and of itself, bring respect to the 
Court. Such respect also depends upon the per-
ception of the justices, the condition of society 
and a degree of good luck. Departure from 
these standards may at some time prove to be 
the better wisdom. But before these notions 
of judicial propriety are discarded as outmoded 
expedients to preserve a fledgling institution, 
we need to understand more thoroughly how 
they arose. To this understanding of ourselves 
and our institutions, Professor Fairman has 
made a worthy contribution. 
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THE BUREAU OF NATIONAl AFFAIRS, INC. (BNA} 
cordially inuites you to try 
.THE UNITED STATES 
LAW WEEK 
for three months at half the regular rate! 
As ern attorney, ·you know the 
value of facts. That's why the 
following facts, regarding THE 
UNITED STATES LAW WEEK, 
should be particularly meaning-
ful to you: 
• The primary function of lAW WEEK 
is to safeguard you against missing a 
single development. of legal importance 
••• yet to save your time by greatly 
re.ducing your reading load! 
• To do this, lAW WEEK's expert 
staff of lawyer-editors sifts thousands 
of. opinions and rulings week by week, 
year after year, for the precedent-
setting few that make new law. These 
significant cases are then digested un· 
der quick-reference topic headings-
such as Antitrust, Taxation, Insurance, 
Public Contracts, labor, Transporta· 
tion, Trade Regulation, Criminal law, 
Public Utilities, Railroads-in the ap-
propriate section of LAW WEEK: 
{l) New Court Decisions, (2) Federal 
Agency Rulings, or (3) Supreme Court 
Opinions. 
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in a special Summary· and Analysis, a 
flve-minufe review in which these legal 
developments are tersely evaluated 
for their effect on current law. 
• A key feature of LAW WEEK is its 
high-speed reporting of Opinions of 
the United States Supreme Court-in 
full text, accompanied by crisp and 
accurate summary digests. Mailed the 
same day they ore handed down, 
these exact photographic reproduc-
tions of the Court's Opinions eliminate 
all possibility of error. 
• LAW WEEK also supplies the full 
texts of all federal statutes of general 
interest, immediately after signing by 
the President. 
• For ease of reference, LAW WEEK 
is fully indexed by topic and by case 
title-both for general law and for 
Supreme Court actions. 
If you concur in the opinion that 
LAW WEEK might be helpful to 
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rate (three months at half the 
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quainted with this valuable 
information service. 
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The Superlawyers. 
By Joseph C. Goulden. 
Weybright and Talley, Inc., New York: 1972. Pp. 408, including index; lji8.95. 
Some very forceful books have been written 
by starting from an assumption which is not, 
and perhaps cannot be, proven and building 
upon that assumption an imposing superstruc-
ture. If the reader's attention is directed 
toward the development at the top, he may 
never think to question the basic assumption. 
Such a method makes it easy to identify the 
good guys from the bad ones. It leads to strong 
writing. I suspect that much of the effective-
ness of the early muckraking analyses of cor-
porate misdeeds, such as Matthew Josephson's 
The Robber Barons and Max Lowenthal's The 
Investor Pays, arises from this device. 
The Superlawyers is really built on the as-
sumption that business enterprise is anti-social, 
that what is good for General Motors is neces-
sarily bad for the United States and that the 
enemy of the consumer is the producer. The 
opposite of corporate interest is public interest. 
In a sense, the book follows the line of The 
Greening of America without attempting to 
support its thesis as Professor Reich does. Per-
haps Mr. Goulden's assumptions can be estab-
lished, but this is at least arguable. 
It is hard to judge how interesting or useful 
the book is to one totally unfamiliar with 
practice in Washington. I came to Washington 
forty years ago. During those years I have 
been employed in both the federal departments 
and the agencies. For a period I even tried, 
not very successfully, to be a "Washington 
lawyer" as Mr. Goulden uses the term. I am 
acquainted more or less intimately with all of 
the main characters in the book and with many 
of the minor ones. Thus you should weigh 
what I have written in lieu of my subjective 
disappointment that my friends are portrayed 
so unflatteringly. 
As you may gather, Mr. Goulden's super-
lawyers do not come off too well. By and large, 
they are portrayed as a conscienceless bunch, 
grabbing for and getting more than their share 
of the world's goods, and leaving the public 
with the deficit. The best thing said for them 
is that they are smart, albeit tricky smart. It 
isn't, however, the Washington lawyer who 
fares worst in this exposition, but really the 
administrative agency, or perhaps the adminis-
trative process itself. Seemingly, it is assumed 
that the whole process is business oriented 
and that unless the consumer-crusaders push 
agencies to the wall, public interest will gen-
erally be ignored. This is a sad appraisal of 
the federal commissions and departments. To 
be sure, it is a common complaint as to so~e 
agencies, all of the time, and as to all of the 
agencies, some of the time. To generalize as 
to all administrators in this way, however, is 
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unfair. An excellent example is William W. 
Goodrich, formerly of the F.D.A. From my 
own personal experience, I would give him high 
marks for long service with the Food and 
Drug Administration where I observed that 
he fought many a good fight for the consum-
er. Mr. Goulden doesn't say anything to the 
contrary; all he does say is that, after resign-
ing as General Counsel of the Food and Drug 
Administration, he became president of a trade 
association. 
Many years ago when I worked for the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, I had a 
good deal to do with the early attempts to 
regulate corporate proxy practices. As I re-
member it, we didn't think of ourselves as a 
quasi-judicial body, but as an administrative 
arm of the government carrying out a Con-
gressional policy. This policy was to afford 
investors a measure of protection by requiring 
that disclosures be made to them when they 
were asked for their proxies for corporate 
meetings or for approval of corporate action. 
There were consumer-crusaders even in those 
remote days and among them was a Mr. Gil-
bert who used to push and prod us into action. 
I believe that he and his kind served a real 
purpose, but I would hate to think that they 
were at the core of the regulation. The best 
way to get better protection for investors, or 
consumers, or the general public is to use care 
in the selection of Commissioners and to build 
up their staffs. It is not practicable to rely on 
outsiders who, with the exception of Mr. 
Nader, have insufficient means and personnel 
to dig out the dirt themselves. A few years 
ago, Mr. Elman, one of Mr. Goulden's good 
guys and a former Commissioner on the Fed-
eral Trade Commission, expressed the feeling 
that his agency could not perform the function 
assigned to it. But with recent changes in the 
leadership and with new staff, the agency is 
now reputed to be making good progress in the 
public interest. 
The Superlawyers is full of accurately pre-
sented facts and case histories. It is also full 
of innuendo. Mr. Goulden often does not spell 
out his conclusions; he states what he finds in 
the record or what he has been told and as-
sumes that the reader will draw his own con-
clusions, presumably unfavorable ones. Take 
as an example, Covington and Burling's han-
dling of the electrical equipment price fixing 
case in which a plea of nolo contendere was 
made by General Electric in exchange for 
statements by the Department of Justice exon-
erating the top management. Consider also the 
consent decree agreed to by the automobile 
manufacturers under Mr. Cutler's guidance in 
order to terminate the government's suit to 
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enjoin a conspiracy to postpone installation of 
antipollution devices. The implications are that 
there was something wrong in the lawyers' 
making the best possible deal with the govern-
ment for their corporate clients when the pub-
lic interest was involved (the settlement pre-
vented a full trial on the merits and the amass-
ing of a record for triple damage suits). 
I wonder how Mr. Goulden reacts to a guilty 
plea for an individual defendant in order to 
obtain a lesser penalty. For example, compare 
Heidi Fletcher's plea in the felony murder case 
where a D.C. policeman was killed during a 
bank holdup. Was it Mr. Williams' job to pro-
tect his client, or the public interest, or are 
they really part of the same thing? Mr. Goulden 
well knows that a lawyer, whether he be a 
Washington lawyer, or from Baltimore, or 
Philadelphia, and whether his client be an in-
digent individual or the Bank of America, and 
whether the offense be homicide or a violation 
of the antitrust laws, must advise and work for 
the optimum outcome from the point of view 
of his client; it is the job of the prosecutor and 
of the court to protect the public interest. Mr. 
Goulden can explain better than I that this is 
how the adversary system is supposed to work. 
Some lawyers want no part in that kind of 
business, but once in it they cannot avoid their 
obligations. 
Similarly, Mr. Goulden cites Mr. Clifford's 
effectiveness in obtaining tax relief for well-
The Paper Chase 
By John Jay Osborn, Jr. 
to-do investors and foundations faced with the 
necessity of disposing of securities by reason 
of the du Pont-General Motors divestment de-
cree. It does not seem to have even remotely 
occurred to Mr. Goulden that such relief 
could have been more in the spirit of the law 
than the collection of huge taxes on the basis 
of a forced sale. 
If the reader of The Superlawyers happens 
to be a newly accredited lawyer seeking a place 
to practice, he should not write off Washington 
on the basis of this book. My own law school 
class was turned loose on the world at the 
very bottom of the 1929 depression. Jobs in 
the large city corporate offices of New York 
were practically non-existent. As a result, that 
portion of the class which would ordinarily 
have gravitated there came instead to Wash-
ington. Thirty or more of us are still in D.C. 
The statistics from the booklet prepared for 
our fortieth reunion make it appear that many 
have done well financially and some have done 
tremendously well in government service. 
However, no member of my class is named by 
Mr. Goulden as a "superlawyer." So, if the 
reader likes the Washington climate and be-
lieves that federal practice, in or out of the 
government, is his dish, there appears to be 
plenty of room to work and earn a living in 
Washington without being named as one of 
Mr. Goulden's antiheroes. 
JOHN F. DAVIS 
Houghton-Mifflin Company, Boston: 1971. Pp. 181 ; $4.95. 
Although legal education and its impact on 
law students has been examined and criticized 
in recent years by teachers, lawyers, psychia-
trists, and even Ralph Nader, the penetrating 
( ?) gaze of the novelist has been surprisingly 
absent from this scrutiny. Now an attempt 
has been made to fill that gap. While The 
Paper Chase has its good moments, mainly due 
to a few social observations and fine classroom 
scenes (I especially liked one memorializing 
the first day of classes, which astonished me 
by making me feel a bit nostalgic - What! 
Nostalgic for law school?!), the novel's fail-
ings render it useless as an aid to understand-
ing the ills of legal education, and worse, make 
the book dull and generally poor entertainment. 
The Paper Chase is a chronicle of the first 
year experience of a Minnesota lad named Hart 
at Harvard Law School (alas, the book is un-
abashedly about Harvard). The chronicle cen-
ters on an affair Hart is having with a Rad-
cliffe drop-out named Susan, daughter of Law 
Professor Kingsfield; the persons in Hart's 
study group; and Hart's experiences in his con-
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tracts class, taught by none other - unbeliev-
ably - than Kingsfield, a grandmaster of the 
Socratic method. 
The affair between Hart and Susan is a 
rocky one, but the conflict between them is 
simple: Susan is trying to lead Hart down 
the primrose path of neo-Keroacian existen-
tialism which Hart's good heartland-of-Amer-
ica soul resists strenuously. A sample of the 
dialogue: 
She sat down beside him in the stand. 
" . . . Why the hell can't you just do 
things?" 
"I am trying to do something," he said 
into the wind. "I'm trying to make sense. 
For Christ's sake, what's wrong with that? 
I just want us to get together." 
He'd lose her either way. If he did noth-
ing, the summer would finish them. 
"Hart," she said, "I like you. I really 
do." 
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"Then why the hell can't we love each 
other?" he shot back. "I can't live this 
way. I need to be organized. I need a way 
of living I can rationalize. I can't sleep. 
I'm going to flunk all my courses. I won't 
pass." 
And so forth. The reasons why Susan wants 
to "do things" and why Hart wants to "get 
organized" are, however, not clear. Indeed, as 
is the case with all the figures in The Paper 
Chase, there is no development of character; 
lacking depth and discernible motivation, the 
characters of the novel merely populate epi. 
sodic sketches of life at Harvard/Cambridge. 
Unfortunately, the sketches are also lacking 
in realism. Hart's study group, for example, 
is composed of some of the strangest people 
seen this side of Love Story. There is Ander· 
son who takes the "maximum utility" approach 
to studying and has a year-long schedule to 
insure that he achieves that goal, Bell who 
compulsively prepares an 800-page outline of 
his property course and ignores his other sub-
jects, and Kevin who flunks all his practice 
exams ("unusual") and then tries to commit 
suicide. (The brief vignettes of Kevin's wife 
are, by the way, one of the few things in the 
book which ring true. One of the more sur-
prising things in law school was the rather low 
calibre of the law wives, there being no law 
husbands in those far-gone days. To para-
phrase Mrs. Holmes: Harvard is full of good 
students and women they married when they 
were young. Why this is so is not clear. Were 
my classmates over·achievers who needed se-
curity of hard-working, dull wives? Were they 
achievers because they were married? Are law 
students inherently too dull to be effective 
competitors in the marriage market?) 
Caricatures such as Anderson, Bell and 
Kevin flesh out Osborn's descriptions of law 
school as a super-competitive, tense and lonely 
place: ' 
Hart left, walking fast, conscious that 
bored students were watching him, know-
ing that he was leaving as another piece 
of data in their decisions: I beat him. I 
studied longer. Well, I don't have to worry 
about Hart. He can't even stay in the Ji. 
brary after eleven. 
While I felt that the resulting picture is far 
more bleak than the real thing, the main prob-
lem with the book is that it fails to identify 
the causes and motives underlying that bleak· 
ness. Is it, for example, a problem endemic to 
academia, unique to law schools, or unique only 
to Osborn's characters? Presented in vacuo, 
the author's descriptions and criticisms are of 
no help in understandling the beast under scru-
tiny. And because the characters cannot be 
understood, they do not stir the reader. When 
those flaws are coupled with tired dialogue, 
the combination can be less than stimulating. 
Such is The Paper Chase. 
WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, II 
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